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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
D.E. V. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY: A REFUSAL TO 
RECOGNIZE A PRESUMPTION THAT EGREGIOUS OFF-
DUTY MISCONDUCT ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE EFFI-
CIENCY OF A GOVERNMENT AGENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In D.E. v. Department of the Navy/ the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to recognize a presumption that the off-duty misconduct 
of a civilian government employee adversely affected a govern-
ment agency's performance.2 The court held that egregious off-
duty misconduct does not constitute grounds for dismissal with-
out a showing that the conduct had an adverse effect on the 
agency. The court declared that federal law requires the agency 
to demonstrate, prior to dismissal of an employee, that an ad-
verse effect on the efficiency of the service emanated from the 
employee's misconduct.8 
Facts of the Case 
On April 18, 1980, D. E.,· a mechanic employed at the Navy 
. Facility in Ferndale, California, was removed from his job for 
off-duty conduct which allegedly adversely affected the em-
ployee/employer relationship.5 The removal was based on the 
employee's plea of nolo contenderes to a child molestation 
1. 721 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Boochever, J.; the other panel members were 
Wright and Canby, JJ.). 
2. With the holding in D. E., the Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit as the only 
two circuits to expressly reject the rule that a presumption of adverse effect may arise 
from certain egregious off·duty misconduct. . 
3. 721 F.2d at 1169. 
4. The court elected to use the defendant's initials to protect the privacy rights of 
those concerned. Id. at 1165. 
5. Id. at 1166. 
6. A plea of "nolo contendre" is an admission of every element of the offense and is 
tantamount to an admission of guilt, but is only a confession and does not dispose of the 
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charge involving his seven year old daughter.' 
D.E. appealed the removal decision to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (Board).8 The Board reversed his removal, 
finding no evidence that D.E.'s misconduct affected his work.9 
However, the Board subsequently granted the Navy's petition to 
review the decision in light of the Board's recent decision in 
Merritt v. Department of Justice. lO In Merritt, the Board held 
that a presumptionll of nexus between the off-duty misconduct 
of an employee and the efficiency of the service may arise when 
the misconduct is egregious.12 Relying on Merritt,13 the Board 
reversed its previous decision, and held that a presumption of 
nexus between D.E.'s' off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of 
the service was proper because of the egregiousness of the off-
duty misconduct. U D.E. petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review 
of the Board's decision. IIi 
7. 721 F.2d at 1166. This was the Navy's second attempt to remove D.E. from his 
position because of the child molestation charge. The Navy first attempted to remove 
D.E. for conduct unbecoming a federal employee. That action failed because of proce-
dural error. 
8. [d. at n.2. The" Merit Systems Protection Board is empowered to review the dis-
missal of a civilian employee by a government agency. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 91 Stat. 1138 
(1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. IV 1980». 
9. 721 F.2d at 1166. 
10. 6 MSPB 493 (1981). 
11. The court in D.E. acknowledged that the presumption at issue was a rebuttable 
presumption. 721 F.2d at 1168. A "rebuttable presumption" is a rule of evidence which 
shifts the burden of proof. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). 
12. 721 F.2d at 1l68. . 
13. 6 MSPB at 509. On the same date that the Board decided Merritt, it also de-
cided Doe v. National Security Agency, 6 MSPB 467 (1981). In both cases, the Board 
recognized a presumption of nexus between a civilian employee's off-duty misconduct 
and the efficiency of the service. " 
14. 721 F.2d at 1166. 
15. The circuit court's jurisdiction to review D.E.'s petition is based on 5 U.S.C. § 
7703 (Supp. IV 1980), which provides in part: 
(a)(l) Any employee or applicant for employment adversely 
affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Merit 
Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial review of the 
order or decision .... (b)(l) [A] petition to review a final or-
der or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit .... (c) In 
any case filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the court shall review the record and hold un-
lawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or conclusions 
found to be - (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 
without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having 
2
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B. BACKGROUND 
Removal of a Civilian Employee for Cause 
Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(Act)18 in an effort to make the federal civil service more effi-
. cient, more businesslike, less political and to ensure that govern-
ment employees are hired and fired solely on the basis of their 
ability.l'1 Under the Act, a government agency may remove a ci-
vilian employee "only for such cause as will promote the effi-
ciency of the service. "18 The Act provides no standard for deter-
been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 
evidence .... 
16. Pub. L. No. 95-454 91 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
17. The Senate Report on Pub. L. No. 95-454 reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Throughout this country's history-and especially since 
1883-there has been a tension between protections estab-
lished to insure that employees are hired and fired solely on 
the basis of their ability, and the need of managers and policy-
makers to have flexibility to perform their jobs. Frequently, 
this tension is characterized as the "rights of employees" ver-
sus the "need for management flexibility." Although it has 
recognized this tension, the [Senate] Committee has viewed 
civil service reform from the standpoint of the public, rather 
than the more limited perspective of either the employee or 
manager. The "rights of employee's" to be selected and re-
moved only on the basis of their competence are concomitant 
with the public's need to have its business conducted compe-
tently. Similarly, the need for Federal executives to manage 
their personnel responsibilities effectively can only be justified 
by the benefit derived by the public from such management 
flexibility. The employee has no right to be incompetent; a 
manager has no right to hire political bed fellows. The public 
has a right to an efficient and effective Government, which is 
responsive to their needs as perceived by elected officials. At 
the same time, the public has a right to a Government which 
is impartially administered. One of the central tasks of the 
civil service reform bill is simple to express but difficult to 
achieve: Allow civil servants to be able to be hired and fired 
more easily, but for the right reasons. This balanced bill 
should help to accomplish that objective. It is an important 
step toward making the government more efficient and more 
accountable to the American people. 
S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
2723,2726. 
18. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. IV 1980). That statute provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) Under regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management, an agency 
may take an action covered by this subchapter against an employee only for such cause 
as will promote the efficiency of the service." 
This same standard governed the removal of civilian employees before the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978. See 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1976). 
3
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mining the required "cause" for removal. However, regulations 
implementing the Act19 provide that "criminal, infamous, dis-
honest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct" are among 
the reasons that constitute the required cause.20 There is no def-
inition of these terms in the regulations, and the regulations do 
not elaborate further upon the statutory requirement. The Act 
also prohibits discrimination against any employee "on the basis 
of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of 
others . . . . "Ill 
In Sherman v. Alexander,22 the Seventh Circuit established 
a standard for determining cause for removal of a civilian em-
ployee. The court declared that before removing a civilian em-
ployee for off-duty misconduct, the government agency must 
make two determinations. First, the agency must determine that 
the employee actually committed the conduct.23 Second, the 
agency must conclude that the employee's removal will promote 
the efficiency of the service.24 The second determination, the fo-
cus of the Ninth Circuit inquiry in D.E.,n requires the showing 
of a nexus between the employee's misconduct and some identi-
fiable detriment to the efficiency of the service.211 
In Doe v. Hampton,27 the District of Columbia Circuit elab-
orated on the nexus requirement. That court declared that there 
must be a clear and direct relationship demonstrated between 
the grounds for disciplinary action and either the employee's 
ability to perform his or her duties or some other legitimate gov-
ernment interest.28 Absent the showing of a nexus, the removal 
action will be dismissed as arbitrary and capricious. Several cir-
cuits, in adopting Hampton, require a showing of a nexus be-
19. 5 C.F.R. §§ 731.201-.401 (1968). 
20. Id. at § 731.201(b). 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (10) (Supp. IV 1980). 
22. 684 F.2d 464 (7th Cit. 1982), cert. denied _ U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 752, 74 L.Ed. 
2d 970 (1983). 
23. Id. at 468. 
24.1d. 
25. Because the defendant in D.E. did not dispute the child molestation charges, the 
first requirement-that the employee actually committed the misconduct-was not at 
issue. 721 F.2d at 1166. 
26. 684 F.2d at 468. 
27. 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
28. Id. at 272. 
4
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tween off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the service.se 
The decisions are generally divided into those in which the 
employee's off-duty misconduct is directly related to the em-
ployee's on-duty responsibilities30 and those in which the off-
duty misconduct is not directly related to the employee's on-
duty responsibilities.31 
Giles v. United States32 is an example of the former. There, 
the Court. of Claims33 upheld the dismissal of an Internal Reve-
nue Service agent, whose duties included the securing of pay-
ments and filings of returns from delinquent taxpayers, for fail-
ure to file timely tax returns. The court found that the 
employee's misconduct undercut the service's efforts to en-
courage voluntary compliance with its rules and regulations. The 
court explained that condoning such conduct could impair the 
credibility of the service with its officers and with the public 
generally. 34 
Where the misconduct occurred off-duty, courts refuse to 
sustain removal where no nexus between the employee's miscon-
duct and the performance of the employee or the service exists.311 
For example, when a product inspector employed by the Army 
was convicted of felony possession of controlled substances,38 or 
when a budget analyst for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration was accused of homosexuality,37 or when an 
Army intelligence operations officer was accused of sexual mis-
29. See Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1977); Giles v. United States, 
553 F.2d 647 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Embry v. Hampton, 470 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1972) and Norton v. Macy, 417 
F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
30. See, e.g., Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976); Giles, 553 F.2d at 
647 and Embry, 470 F.2d at 146. 
31. See, e.g., Young 568 F.2d at 1253; Norton, 417 F.2d at 1161; Bonet, 661 F.2d at 
1071 and Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1978). 
32. 553 F.2d 647 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Wroblaski, 528 
F.2d at 852, upheld the dismissal of an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer 
for having nonimmigrant aliens in her home performing domestic services. 
33. Pub. L. 97-164 § 144(1), 96 Stat. 45, amended 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l) (Supp. IV 
1980) by substituting "United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" for 
"Court of Claims or a United States court of appeals." 
34. 553 F.2d at 650. 
35. See supra note 31. 
36. Young, 568 F.2d e.t 1253. 
37. Norton, 417 F.2d at 1161. 
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conduct,38 failure by the agency to show the necessary nexus be-
tween the off-duty misconduct and the performance of the em-
ployee or the agency has resulted in reversal of the employee's 
dismissal. 
Prior to D.E., the Ninth Circuit, like the majority of cir-
cuits, required the showing of a nexus between off-duty miscon-
duct and the efficiency of the service. In Singer v. United States 
Civil Service Commission,39 the Ninth Circuit's leading decision 
dealing with removal of a civilian employee for off-duty miscon-
duct,40 the court reversed the dismissal of an employee of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission accused of homo-
sexual conduct. The Ninth Circuit, adopting the reasoning of the 
District of Columbia Circuit in Norton v. Macy,41 held that the 
court at least must be able to discern a reasonably foreseeable 
connection between an employee's potentially embarrassing con-
duct and the efficiency of the service.42 
Presumption of Nexus 
Neither the Act43 nor its implementing regulations44 ex-
pressly permit an agency to presume a nexus between an em-
ployee's off-duty conduct and the efficiency of the service. 
Congress expressly placed the burden of going forward and 
the burden of proof in removal actions involving civilian employ-
ees on the agency.411 The Act revised the standards governing ap-
peals from actions dismissing civilian employees to provide addi-
38. Hoska v. United States Department of the Navy, 677 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
39. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976). 
40. See also, Mindel v. United States Civil Service Commission, 312 F. Supp. 485 
(N.D. Cal. 1970) and Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973). 
41. See supra note 37. 
42. 530 F.2d at 253. 
43. See supra note 16. 
44. See supra note 19. 
45. The original version of the bill placed the burden of proof on the employee. The 
Senate version of the bill, which ultimately was adopted, rejected the proposed shifting 
of the burden. With regard to that burden, the Senate Report states "[a]s under current 
law, the agency would continue to have the burden of going forward with its case first, 
and the burden of convincing the decision maker in the end that its action was lawful." 
S. Rep. No. 969, 95th Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
2723, 2777. 
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tional protection to employees dismissed for misconduct.46 The 
new standard makes it less difficult for an employ~e to appeal an 
agency's adverse action.47 The prior standard provided that the 
agency's action would be sustained if it was supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.4s Congress modified the standard so 
that the agency's action will not be sustained if there was (1) a 
procedural error which substantially impaired the employee's 
rights; (2) prohibited discrimination; or (3) a decision not sup-
ported by substantial evidence.49 
While the Act provides that an agency may consider any 
conviction of an employee in determining the employee's suita-
bility or fitness for employment,1I0 conviction of a crime does not 
per se disqualify an individual from employment. III 
Despite the Act and a substantial number of cases requiring 
a nexus between the employee's misconduct and the efficiency of 
the service,1I2 the Board, and a minority of the courtslS have rec-
ognized a presumption of nexus. 
The Board first recognized the presumption in Merritt. In 
that decision, the Board relying on dicta in Young v. Hamp-
46. [d. at 2776. 
47. [d. The Act also changed the standard governing appeals from actions based on 
unacceptable performance. Congress revised the standard to make it more difficult for an 
employee to appeal an agency's adverse action. Congress wanted to avoid unnecessary 
reversals of agency actions involving unacceptable performance because of procedural 
error or because the judgment of the agency was not given sufficient weight. [d. 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. See supra note 21. That provision,. which prohibits discrimination against any 
employee provides that "nothing ... shall prohibit an agency from taking into account 
in determining suitability or fitness any conviction of the employee . . . for any 
crime . ... " 
51. The House version of the antidiscriminatory provision of the bill was modified 
so that conviction of a crime may be taken into consideration when determining fitness 
or suitability of an individual for employment. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Com-
mittee on Conference, H. Conf. Rep. No. 1717, 95th Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 
U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 2723, 2864. The Report specifically states, however, that 
"[tJhis provision is not meant as an encouragement to take conviction of a crime into 
account when determining suitability .... Nor is it to be inferred that conviction of a 
crime is meant to disqualify an employee .... " [d. 
52. See Norton, 417 F.2d at 1161; Young, 568 F.2d at 1253 and Phillips, 586 F.2d at 
1007. 
53. Merritt, supra note 10; Doe V. National Security Agency, supra note 13; Gueory 
V. Hampton, 5lO F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1974); and Cooper V. United States, 630 F.2d 727 
(Ct. Cl. 1980). 
7
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ton/,4 permitted a presumption of nexus to arise as a result of 
the off-duty possession and use of marijuana by a correctional 
officer employed by the Bureau of Prisons.1i1i 
In Gueory v. Hampton,lis the District of Columbia Circuit 
held that conviction of a postal employee for manslaughter 
demonstrated the requisite nexus without a showing of aD. ex-
plicit deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service.1i7 How-
ever, the court expressly stated that all crimes do not provide 
the nexus, and left the difficult task of drawing a line of demar-
cation for a future time. liS 
In Cooper v. United States,1i9 the United States Court of 
Claims reviewed the removal of an electronics engineer from a 
naval training equipment center for off-duty acts of sexual mis-
conduct.so While not directly discussing the nexus requirement, 
the court stated that it had no quarrel with the government's 
finding that sexual misconduct adversely affected the employer-
employee relationship.sl The court remanded the case for a de-
termination of whether the misconduct actually occurred.sll 
Prior to the decisions in Gueory and Cooper, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Norton v. MacyS3 observed that a presumption of "immo-
rality" tends to discourage careful analysis because it unavoid-
ably connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or otherwise 
universal standards of rectitude.s4 In Bonet v. United States 
Postal Service,sli the Fifth Circuit went a step further and ex-
pressly rejected the idea that a presumption of nexus arises in 
54. 568 F.2d at 1253. The court in Young stated "in certain egregious circumstances, 
where the adverse effect of retention on the efficiency of the service could, in light of the 
nature of the conduct, reasonably be deemed substantial ... the nature of the miscon-
duct may 'speak for itself.''' [d. at 1257. 
55. 6 MSPB at 509. 
56. 510 F.2d at 1222. 
57. [d. at 1226. 
58. [d. 
59. 639 F.2d at 727. 
60. [d. at 728. The employee in that case had been charged with indecent conduct 
and sexual battery involving a five year old child. 
6!. 639 F.2d at 730. 
62. [d. 
63. See supra note 37. 
64. [d. at 1165. 
65. 661 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981). 
8
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certain egregious circumstances.ss In Bonet, the court reversed 
the removal of a postal manager indicted, but not convicted, for 
indecency with a child.s7 The Board had affirmed the employee's 
removal, finding that the misconduct constituted a violation of 
the .code of ethical conduct for employees, which prohibited any 
employee from engaging in criminal, dishonest, notoriously dis-
graceful or immoral conduct.s8 
The Bonet court observed that the agency's reliance on in-
ternal regulations proscribing certain types of conduct amounted 
to a presumed or per se nexus. S8 The court held that the burden 
of showing the required nexus between the misconduct and the 
efficiency of the service lay with the agency and may not be 
shifted to the employee by presumption or application of a per 
se rule.70 The court reasoned that the Act precluded the charac-
terization of certain off-duty conduct as so obnoxious as to cre-
ate, per se, the required nexus.71 Thus, the Bonet court refused 
to relieve the agency of its statutory duty to show a connection 
between the employee misconduct and the efficiency of the 
service.72 
Prior to the decision in D.E., the Ninth Circuit had not ad-
dressed the specific issue of whether a presumption of nexus be-
. tween an employee's off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of 
the service may be raised. 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
In D.E., the Ninth Circuit considered two issues, whether 
the egregiousness of off-duty misconduct can give rise to a pre-
sumption of nexus between the misconduct and the agency's 
performance, and whether in the absence of such a presumption, 
the evidence showed that the employee's misconduct adversely 
affected the efficiency of the service. 
The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the Board's decision that a 
66. Id. at 1077. 
67. Id. at 1073. 
68. Id. at 1076. 
69. Id. at 1077. 
70. Id. at 1078. 
71. Id. at 1077. 
72. Id. 
9
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presumption of nexus was raised by the egregiousness of D.E.'s 
misconduct, held that such a presumption permits a government 
agency to remove an employee without offering evidence of ac:" 
tual adverse impact on the service.73 The court declared that 
such a presumption arbitrarily shifts to the employee the burden 
of showing that the employee's continued employment has no 
adverse effect on the efficiency of the service.7• The court con-
cluded that Congress, in enacting the Civil Service Reform Act 
of 1978, intended to require the agency to prove that removal 
based on off-duty conduct would promote the efficiency of the 
service.711 
The Court, acknowledging that some circuits have recog-
nized a presumption of nexus based on egregious conduct, sum-
marily disagreed with the decisions by those circuits.7s The coUrt 
declared that the Board's reliance in Merritt on the dictum in 
Young v. Hampton," which permitted a presumption of nexus 
to arise in certain circumstances, was not conclusive.78 In distin-
guishing Young from the present case, the court hypothesized 
that a conviction of off-duty misconduct directly related to the 
employee's on-duty responsibilities could reasonably be regarded 
as having a substantial adverse effect 0'0 the efficiency of the ser-
vice.79 However, the court reasoned that where the misconduct is 
totally unrelated to the employee's duties, as was the case in 
D.E., no basis for a conclusion of nexus under the reasoning in 
Young existed.80 The court noted that even before the Act, 
courts generally were unwilling to presume that a discharge will 
promote the efficiency of the service.81 
The court further held that without the presumption of 
nexus, the Board had failed to produce substantial evidence 
showing a nexus between the defendant's misconduct and the 
agency's performance.82 The court observed that the agency had 
73. 721 F.2d at 1168. 
74.Id. 
75. Id. at 1169. 
76.Id. 
77. See supra note 36. 
78. 721 F.2d at 1168. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 1169. 
82.Id. 
10
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failed to show either fault with D.E.'s job performance or that 
his off-duty conduct had been a source of "notoriety, embarrass-
ment or discomfiture" to the agency. The court noted that the 
purely conclusory statements of his superiors that they no longer 
had any "trust or confidence" in him fell short of the substantial 
evidence required by the Act for removal.83 
D. ANALYSIS 
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's decision in D.E. fails to 
establish a standard for determining the required nexus in cases 
involving the dismissal of an employee for off-duty misconduct." 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the Ninth Circuit will develop this 
standard since actions involving the discharge of civilian em-
ployees reach federal courts only upon appeal by the discharged 
employee. No judicial review is available to employing agencies 
when the Board reverses the agency's removal action for failure 
to prove the required nexus.81i Consequently, no opportunity ex-
ists for federal courts to inform the Board whether it erred in 
reversing an agency's removal of an employee. Judicial review 
exists only when the Board erred in sustaining a removal. As a 
result, the judicial decisions only provide outer limits for deter-
mining when removal of an employee fails to promote the effi-
ciency of the service. They provide no such limits for determin-
ing when the removal of an employee promotes the efficiency of 
the service. 
The Ninth Circuit appropriately refused to relieve the 
agency of its burden to establish the required nexus. As the 
court observed, a presumption of nexus would shift the burden 
of proof from the agency to the employee.86 Proving the required 
nexus places no onerous burden on the agency. It merely re-
quires the agency to comply with a standard of reasonableness 
and nonarbitrariness. Conversely, the adverse effect of shifting 
the burden to the employee would be substantial. It would re-
quire every government employee charged with serious off-duty 
misconduct to prove that his or her continued employment had 
83. [d. 
84. The Ninth Circuit specifically left unanswered the issue of whether "certain 
egregious circumstances" could ever be found to be deemed to have a substantial effect 
on an employee's job performance. 721 F.2d at 1168. 
85. See supra note 15. 
86. 721 F.2d at 1168. 
11
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no adverse effect on the efficiency of the service, which would be 
a difficult burden to meet. 
Furthermore, Courts which recognize a presumption of 
nexus have failed to. establish criteria for determining under 
what circumstances an employee's off-duty misconduct could be 
considered so "egregious" as to give rise to a presumption of 
nexus. Without principled standards, a presumption of nexus 
tacitly permits and even encourages arbitrary and discrimina-
tory actions by an agency. That is, a presumption of nexus es-
sentially enables government agencies to purge themselves of 
persons whose conduct may be frowned upon by their superiors 
under the pretense of promoting the efficiency of the service. 
Government agencies thereby would be able to require noncon-
formists to comport themselves according to approved or appro-
priate lifestyles. Hence, the Ninth Circuit's rejection of a pre-
sumption of a nexus between egregious off-duty misconduct and 
the agency's performance represents a positive step toward 
preventing abuses of executive discretion in agency personnel 
actions. 
It is the judiciary, not a government agency, that is empow-
ered to punish the criminal conduct of civilians.87 An agency 
should not be allowed to dismiss a civilian employee as a penalty 
for criminal behavior beyond that prescribed by law when there 
is no showing that the misconduct had any adverse effect on the 
agency. 
Kathleen Eldridge* 
87. Embry, 470 F.2d at 147. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986 
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TODD SHIPYARDS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT CLEARS THE 
AIR FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE VICTIMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Todd Shipyards Corporation v. Black, I the Ninth Circuit 
found an employer covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)2 fully liable for an em-
ployee's occupational disability even though a subsequent non-
covered employer contributed to the disability. The court fur-
ther held that the benefits would be based on the employee's 
income at the time the disability became known, rather than at 
the time of exposure to the substance which caused the disease. 
Plaintiff, Gerald L. Black, worked for Todd Shipyards from 
1942 through 1945, and for Boeing Aircraft Corporation from 
1951 until he was forced to quit for health reasons in 1977.3 His 
condition was diagnosed as asbestosis, a severe lung disease 
caused by inhalation of asbestos particles.· Black had been ex-
posed to asbestos during his employment at both companies.6 
Black filed a claim under the LHWCA against Todd and its 
insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.6 The administra-
tive law judge (ALJ)7 found Todd liable and determined that 
1. 717 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were 
Browning, J., and Tuttle, J., sitting by designation). 
2. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 
(1976). 
3. 717 F.2d at 1282-83. Black's nose bled and he coughed up blood. On May 27, 
1977, the upper right lobe of Black's lung was removed because of squamous cell carci-
noma. Black died of this condition on April 2, 1981, before litigation was completed. His 
widow pursued the action as provided by the LHWCA. Id. 
4. 717 F.2d at 1283. Asbestosis has been shown to be a cause of cancer, especially of 
the bronchial tubes and lining of the lungs. 1 SCHMIDT'S, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF 
MEDICINE A-308. 
5. 717 F.2d at 1282-83. At Todd Shipyards, the asbestos material was thrown about 
"like snowballs." At Boeing, asbestos was used in gloves and fireproof curtains. Id. 
6.Id. 
7. Id. Claims under the LHWCA are filed with the deputy commissioner's office. If 
the parties dispute the facts, the matter is heard by an ALl. The ALJ's decision may be 
appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB), a three-member panel. Appeals from the 
BRB are taken to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals having jurisdiction over the area 
where the injury occurred. 33 U.S.C. §§ 919, 921 (1976). The BRB is an administrative 
body, its interpretations are not entitled to any deference from the courts. Potomac Elec. 
Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 278 n.18 
(1980). 
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Black's benefits would be based on 1977 wages.s The Benefit Re-
view Board (BRB) upheld the decision.9 On appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit, Todd contended that Black's subsequent exposure at 
Boeing relieved it of liability; secondly, even if Todd were liable, 
liability should be apportioned between itself and Boeing; and 
finally, benefits should be based on Black's wages at the time of 
exposure to the asbestos rather than the time of manifestation 
of the disease. Io 
B. BACKGROUND 
Statutory Framework 
Prior to the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927, certain clas-
ses of maritime workers, such as loaders, unloaders, repairers, 
and builders of shipsll were not covered by either maritime or 
state workers' compensation laws. I2 In enacting the LHWCA, 
Congress intended to compensate these workers for wages lost 
due to disability or death suffered as a result of injuries sus-
tained while employed "on the navigable waters"IS of the United 
States. l4 The LHWCA is the worker's exclusive remedy against 
the employer, Iii and the employee is not required to establish the 
employer's fault. IS The injured17 employee must file a claim 
within one year from the time the employee is aware or reason-
ably should be aware of the injury. IS When an injured employee 
8. 717 F.2d at 1283. Black's wages in 1945 were $92.00 per week. His 1977 wages 
were $293.86 per week. [d. at 1287. 
9. [d. at 1283. The BRB was sharply divided. Two members ruled Todd fully liable, 
a dissenting member said Boeing should be liable. Of the two who held Todd liable, one 
thought Black's benefits should he based on 1945 wages, the other thought 1977 wages 
should be used. The dissenting member refused to rule on the benefits issue. A per 
curiam decision was issued allowing the ALJ's decision to stand. Black v. Todd Ship-
yards Corp., 13 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 682 (June 12, 1981). 
10. 717 F.2d at 1282. 
11. See 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1976). 
12. Stocker, An Overview of the LHWCA, 12 Forum 674, 675 (1977). 
13. "Navigable waters" include "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, 
building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in 
loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1976). 
14. Stocker, supra note 12 at 675. 
15. The employee may not bring a suit against the employer for negligence. 33 
U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976). 
16. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (1976). 
17. "Injury" includes "such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out 
of such employment ... " 33 U.S.C. § 902(2) (1976). 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1976). 
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establishes the employer's liability,19 that employee is entitled to 
compensation based on his or her wages "at the time of 
injury. "20 
Assessment of Liability 
The LHWCA contains no provisions addressing the issue of 
liability among multiple culpable employers. The Second Circuit 
in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo,21 established the "last 
employer rule," which operates to assess full liability for an in-
jured worker's benefits to the last employer that contributed to 
the worker's injuries.22 In rejecting an apportionment of liability, 
the Cardillo court reasoned that the last employer approach was 
the most equitable to employers and injured employees.23 The 
court observed that a last employer rule was within the intent of 
the LHWCA for the reason that Congress had rejected sugges-
tions to apportion liability during the creation of the LHWCA.24 
Five other circuits have recognized the Cardillo rule without 
deviation.211 
The Ninth Circuit in Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop,28 
19. The employer is liable if the injury arises from the employment regardless of the 
employer's fault. 33 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (1976). 
20. 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1976). Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972 to increase bene-
fits in an attempt to counterbalance the effects of inflation. Amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 
(1972). In providing adequate benefits Congress intended not only to meet the financial 
needs of disabled employees, but also to motivate employers to provide the fullest mea-
sure of on-the-job safety by having employers bear the cost of unsafe conditions. H.R. 
Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 
4698,4699. 
21. 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955). The court joined sev-
eral cases with similar facts concerning employees losing their hearing due to exposure to 
occupational noise. In each situation all employers were covered by the LHWCA. Id. at 
139-142. 
22. Id. at 145. 
23. Id. at 144-45. The administration of the LHWCA would be facilitated by elimi-
nating the delays caused by determining multiple liability. Id. at 145. 
24. Id. at 145. 
25. Hon v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 699 F.2d 441, 443 
(8th Cir. 1983); Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327, 329 
(4th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 647 F.2d 518, 523 (5th Cir. 
1981); General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 
1977); Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 911 (1979). 
26. 580 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979). 
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adopted the Cardillo rule and articulated its rationale for apply-
ing the rule: the ultimate fairness of the rule lies in the fact that 
each maritime employer will be the last employer a proportion-
ate share of the time.27 
Effect of Subsequent Non-Covered Employment 
In Fulks v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.,28 the Fifth Circuit 
ruled that exposure to harmful substances during subsequent 
noncovered activity did not relieve an employer of liability 
under the LHWCA.29 Rejecting the contention that the LHWCA 
was not applicable because the last exposure did not occur on 
navigable waters, the Fulks court reasoned that the Cardillo rule 
was designed to simplify liability assessment among multiple 
employers and was not meant to allow an otherwise responsible 
employer to escape liability.30 The Fulks court assessed liability 
for LHWCA benefit to Avondaie despite the marginal amount of 
exposure which occurred during LHWCA-covered 
employment. 31 
In Green v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock CO.,32 
the BRB determined that subsequent exposure by a noncovered 
employer did not exempt a previous LHWCA-covered employer 
from liability.33 Noting that the Cardillo rule applies only to 
LHWCA-covered employers, the BRB found it unnecessary to 
resolve the issue of the subsequent employer's liability.34 Relying 
on the Fulks reasoning that the Cardillo rule was designed to 
assess liability, not to make claimants ineligible for LHWCA 
benefits, the BRB held Newport News liable for Green's 
injuries.81i 
27. [d. at 1336. No court has apportioned liability under the LHWCA. See Fitzhugh, 
Disheartening Prospects: The Stress of Occupational Disease Cases on the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 22 S. Tex. L.J. 471, 479 (1982). 
28. 637 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. lOBO (1981). 
29. 637 F.2d at 1010. Fulks worked as a sandblaster for sixteen years, but only two 
months of that time was on navigable waters. Fulks developed silicosis from inhaling 
sand particles. [d. 
30. [d. at 1011-1012. 
31. [d. 
32. 13 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 562 (June 12, 1981). 
33. [d. at 563. The claimant had been exposed to asbestos while working for New-
port News and may have been further exposed during subsequent employment. [d. 
34. [d. at 566. 
35. [d. at 565. In an unpublished opinion, Green v. Newport News Shipbuilding & 
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Time of Injury 
Although no definition of "time of injury" appears in the 
LHWCA, in Urie u. Thompson,38 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
(FELA),37 "time of injury" is the time of manifestation for stat-
ute of limitations purposes.38 In Urie, the claimant brought suit 
under the FE LA after the three-year statute of limitations had 
run, claiming that he could not know of his injuries until the 
symptoms manifested themselves years after the exposure.39 
Reasoning that the worker's ignorance of his condition should 
not result in a denial of a remedy, the Court held that the stat-
ute of limitations did not commence until the injury manifested 
itself. "0 Five circuit courts subsequently have applied Urie rea-
soning in determining the LHWCA statute of limitations."1 
Circuit courts have not defined "time of injury" for the pur-
pose of calculating benefits, and the BRB has been inconsistent 
in arriving at benefits in cases involving occupational diseases 
with long latency periods. In the most recent decision on this 
issue, Dunn u. Todd Shipyards,"2 the BRB reversed an earlier 
decision which calculated benefits based on income at the time 
of manifestation of injury.43 In Dunn, the BRB examined several 
possible approaches to calculating benefits"" before deciding that 
the "time of exposure" approach was the most appropriate.4& 
Drydock Co., 81-1668 (4th Cir. 1983), the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the BRB 
to determine the issue of subsequent exposure. The BRB.determined there was no sub-
sequent exposure. 15 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 465 (July 29, 1983). 
36. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). 
37. Federal Employers' Liability act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-GO (1976). 
38. 337 U.S. at 170. The claimant developed silicosis caused by exposure to dust 
entering the locomotive in which he worked. Id. 
39. 337 U.S. at 165. 
40. Id. at 170. 
41. Hon, 699 F.2d at 443; Todd Shipyards Corp. V. Allan, 666 F.2d 399, 401 (9th Cir. 
1982); Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc., 647 F.2d at "52; Stancil v. Massey, 436 F.2d 274, 
276-77; (D.C. Cir. 1970); Aerojet-General Shipyards, Inc. V. O'Keefi"e, 413 F.2d 793, 795 
(5th Cir. 1969); Cardillo, 225 F.2d at 142-43. 
42. 13 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 647 (June 12, 1981). 
43. Dunn reversed Stark V. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 6 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 600 
(August 31, 1977), reaff'd on reconsideration, 10 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 350 (March 
30, 1979). 
44. 13 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) at 663. The BRB examined "time of injury" as 
being "time of exposure," "time of disability," and "time of manifestation." Id. 
45. The reasons the Dunn BRB found were: First, the date of exposure is easiest to 
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C. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Liability Assessment 
[Vol. 14:12 
The Ninth Circuit, addressing the issue of how to assess lia-
bility, rejected Todd's contention that the Cardillo rule should 
be applied to assess liability only to the last employer, Boeing.46 
Noting that the purpose of the Cardillo under Fulks·7 was to 
simplify liability assessment among cUlpable LHWCA-covered 
employers, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that application of the 
rule is limited to situations where all the employers are covered 
by the LHWCA.·8 The court suggested that strict application of 
the Cardillo rule could result in denial of compensation to an 
injured worker, defeating the LHWCA's purpose of providing 
covered workers with compensation for their injuries.49 The 
court also compared the last covered employer rule to state 
workers' compensation laws, noting that many states allow a 
worker to claim against the last employer in that state even 
when a subsequent employer in a different state contributed to 
the worker's injuries.GO 
With respect to Todd's contention that liability should be 
apportioned, the court noted that the congressional intent in en-
acting the LHWCA was to assure full compensation to injured 
workers without burdening them with the necessity of litigating 
proportions of liability. G1 The court, noting that Cardillo and 
Cordero prohibited the apportionment of liability under the 
ascertain, therefore litigation is simplified. Second, the date of exposure will always par-
allel the worker's dates of employment. Third, the employer's insurance may have ex-
pired since the time of the injured worker's employment. Fourth, retired workers have no 
wages on which to base benefits. Fifth, the date of manifestation approach may subject 
employers to liability in excess of that anticipated when the insurance was purchased. Id. 
at 663-665. 
46. 717 F.2d at 1285. 
47. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
48. 717 F.2d at 1285. 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 1285-86, citing Garner v. Vanadium Corp. of America, 194 Colo. 358, 572 
P.2d 1205 (1977), and Smith v. Lawrence Baking Co., 370 Mich. 169, 121 N.W. 2d 684 
(1963). For a discussion of the last employer rule as applied in both federal and state 
laws, see 4 A. Larson, Law of Workman's Compensation § 95.21 (1981). 
51. 717 F.2d at 1286. The court also rejected as irrelevant Todd's argument that 
Black may have a remedy against Boeing under Washington State Workers' Compensa-
tion Law. The court noted that state law may not grant Black full recovery and the 
result would be that Black would not be adequately compensated. Id. at 1286 n.5. 
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LHWCA, referred to the difficulty of apportioning fault for a 
disease that had a long latency period.1i2 The court concluded 
that it would be practically impossible to apportion liability with 
respect to the injury or disease caused by each employer.1i3 
Time of Injury 
Subsequent to finding Todd liable, the court addressed the 
problem of determining the amount of Black's benefits. The 
court acknowledged the trend in other workers' compensation 
system of defining "time of injury" as "time of manifestation" 
for commencing' the statute of limitations.1i4 Recognizing that 
the purpose behind the LHWCA is to compensate workers for 
wages lost due to occupational injuries,1i1i the court rejected the 
"time of exposure" approach because compensation would be 
based on earnings unrelated to the worker's income at the time 
he or she must stop working. liS 
The court found the "time of manifestation" approach ap-
. propriate in the context of asbestosis, noting that while asbesto-
sis begins when asbestos fibers are inhaled, over ninety percent 
of urban dwellers have some asbestos-related scarring.1i7 Since 
most of these people will never develop asbestosis, the court 
found it unrealistic to consider a person "injured" at the time of 
the initial exposure. liS 
In rejecting the "time of exposure" approach espoused by 
Dunn,1i9 the court explained the "time of manifestation" is easier 
to ascertain in occupational disease cases since long latency peri-
ods render impossible the precise determination of the moment 
the exposure became injurious. so The court stated that the 
LHWCA requires only that the injury arise from the worker's 
52. Id. at 1286. 
53. [d. 
54. Id. at 1290. 
55. Palacios v. Campbell Industries, 633 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1980). 
56. 717 F.2d at 1289-90. 
57. [d., citing Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 
(1st Cir. 1982). 
58. 717 F.2d at 1290. 
59. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
60. 717 F.2d at 1290. 
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employment,61 not that the injury manifest itself during the 
course of employment.62 Additionally, the court found no reason 
to burden a claimant with any inadequacies in the employer's 
insurance coverage.63 Finally, provided the worker is retired 
when manifestation of the injury occurs, benefits could be based 
on the wages earned during the last year of active employment.64 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Todd decision provides precise rules for future admin-
istration of the LHWCA in the Ninth Circuit. Since it is esti-
mated that up to eleven million workers were exposed to asbes-
tos before the dangers became widely known in the late 1960's,611 
it is likely that many workers will be filing LHWCA claims for 
asbestosis and asbestos-related injuries. The Todd rules facili-
tate assessment of liability and provide a realistic standard for 
computing benefits in situations involving an occupational 
disease. 
The BRB decisions in Black and Dunn illustrate the 
problems administrators faced prior to Todd. Oli the same day, 
two BRB panels reached opposite decisions with respect to the 
definition of "time of injury" for the purpose 'of calculating ben-
efits.66 Furthermore, neither BRB panel was able to reach a 
unanimous decision.67 After Todd, claimants, employers, and ad-
ministrators can expect a un'iform determination of benefits in 
cases involving occupational diseases. 
The Ninth Circuit's definition of "time of injury" achieves a 
realistic measurement of a claimant's loss. A person's wages in 
1945 bear little relationship to earnings lost due to disability in 
1977. Over a period of years, factors such as inflation and ac-
. quired work skills increase the income of most workers. Given 
that the purpose of the LHWCA is to compensate workers for 
61. See u.s.c. § 910 (1976). 
62. 717 F.2d at 1291. 
63. [d. at 1291-92. 
64. [d. at 1292. 
65. Fitzhugh, supra note 27, at 478. For a discussion of the increasing problems of 
occupational disease litigation, see Smith & Channon, The Rising Storm, 17 Forum 139 
(1982). 
66. See supra notes 9, 42-45 and accompanying text. 
67. [d. 
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wages lost due to disability, compensation for last wages should 
be commensurate with an employer's actual earning capacity 
over the period covered. 
Additionally, the Todd approach is consistent with a major-
ity of other compensation systems in its method of determining 
benefits, in that the "time of manifestation" approach prevails 
in most jurisdictions.88 Todd also adds consistency within the 
LHWCA to judicial definitions of terms. Previous courts have 
defined "time of injury" as "time of manifestation of disease" 
under the LHWCA statute of limitations.89 It seems inconsistent 
to define the same term as "time of exposure to a harmful sub-
stance" for another provision of the LHWCA. The court dis-
posed of this anomoly with its definition of "time of injury" as 
"time of manifestation" for the purpose of calculating benefits. 
While the Todd decision might appear unfair to Todd Ship-
yards with respect to liability assessment, in that liability was 
not assessed in proportion to fault, the major impediment to 
more fairly assessing liability under the facts of the case was the 
LHWCA's lack of jurisdiction over Boeing. The Cardillo reason-
ing70 is inapplicable where there is a noncovered employer, be-
cause a non covered employer is outside the LHWCA's jurisdic-
tion and therefore cannot be held liable a proportionate number 
of times. Implicit in the Todd decision is a balancing between 
implementation of Congressional intent to compensate workers 
and the desire to assess liability equitably among multiple em-
ployers. The court feared that Black would not be fully compen-
sated if he were forced to seek relief from state workers' com-
pensation laws.7l Accordingly, the court sacrificed the desire to 
devise a more equitable scheme of liability in favor of following 
the LHWCA directive of compensating workers. 
68. See 2 A. Larson, Law of Workman's Compensation § 60. 11 (d) (1979). One exam-
ple is California, which has utilized the "time of manifestation" approach for several 
decades. Cal. Lab. Code § 5412 (West 1976); Argonaut Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Comm'n, 104 Cal. App. 2d 27, 31, 230 P.2d 637, 639 (1951). 
69. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The Todd decision is encouraging to maritime workers be-
cause the court's ruling furthers congressional efforts to protect 
these workers. After Todd, workers are covered even if subse-
quent employment contributes to disabilities, and compensation 
will be based on a realistic method of computation when the in-
jury manifests itself long after employment ceased. 
Had the Todd court devised a method of apportioning lia-
bility between covered and non-covered employers, the worker 
would be forced to bring a second claim under state law because 
federal courts would have no jurisdiction to enforce a decision 
against a non-covered employer. This result would be contrary 
to past legislative and judicial efforts to relieve LHWCA claim-
ants of complicated litigation.7J 
Herbert F. Miller* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. BATTLING THE SECRETARY: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S PROTEC-
TION AGAINST WRONGFUL TERMINATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS 
In a series of recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 
found that the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services has wrongfully terminated benefits to recipients 
of Supplemental Security income (SSI), and Social Security Dis-
ability Income (SSDI). 
In the landmark case of Patti v. Schweiker,l the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that once the Secretary has found a disability to exist, 
72. See supra note 51. 
·Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985 
1. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Pregerson, J., and Orrick, D.J., sitting by designation). 
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a presumption arises that the disability continues to exist,2 and 
the Secretary has the burden of coming forward with evidence 
that the claimant's condition has changed.3 
In that case, Patti had undergone a lumbar laminectomy in 
1973, and began receiving SSDI benefits in 1976.4 In 1979 the 
Secretary informed Patti that her benefits would be terminated, 
as she was no longer disabled. ~ This determination was upheld 
by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the basis of medical 
reports from two doctors, and electromyographic and radio-
graphic studies.6 
The Ninth Circuit held that although the claimant never 
loses the burden of proving continuing disability after the Secre-
tary has determined that the disability has ceased, the claimant 
is entitled to a presumption that his condition has remained un-
changed, and the Secretary therefore has the burden of coming 
forward with evidence to rebut that presumption.' 
After a careful analysis of the medical records, the Ninth 
Circuit was unable to find any evidence that showed that Patti's 
condition had changed since the initial determination.8 The de-
termination of the ALJ was therefore reversed.9 
In !ida u. Heckler,1° the Ninth Circuit applied the Patti 
standard, finding that the Secretary had not come forward with 
sufficient evidence to show that lida's condition had improved 
before ordering termination of benefits. 11 lida had been receiving 
benefits due to a back injury.12 When his case was scheduled for 
reexamination, he was seen by four doctors, including one hired 
by the Secretary. None of the doctors found lida's condition to 
2. [d. at 586-87. 
3. [d. at 587. 
4. [d. at 583. 
5. [d. The Secretary had previously attempted to terminate benefits in 1977, but 
was overruled at that time by an A.L.J. 
6. [d. 
7. [d. at 586-87. 
8. [d. at 586. 
9. [d. at 587. 
10. 705 F .. 2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Choy and Canby, JJ.) 
11. [d. at 364. 
12. [d. 
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have improved, but the Secretary nonetheless ordered termina-
tion of benefits. 13 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Secretary's contention that 
there was conflicting medical evidence which the Secretary had 
merely resolved. The court therefore ordered reinstatement of 
benefits without further proceedings. 14 
In Brown v. Heckler,1& the Ninth Circuit again found that 
the Patti standard had not been met. Brown had been receiving 
SSI benefits for leg and back injuries, alcoholism, and psycho-
neurosis. 16 These benefits were terminated by the Secretary on 
the sole basis that Brown's back injury had improved.17 On ap-
peal to the ALJ, the Secretary's decision was upheld, on the 
further finding that Brown was not addicted to alcohol. 18 The 
ALJ held no hearing, predicating his finding of non-addiction on 
Brown's responses to interrogatories, in which she denied pre-
sent or former alcohol abuse.19 
The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ had a duty to fully 
and fairly develop the record in social security cases, even when 
the claimant is represented by counsepo Bearing in mind an al-
coholic's tendency to deny or rationalize his abuse, the court 
found that by proceeding without a hearing, on the basis of the 
interrogatories alone, the ALJ had failed to perform his duty.21 
The court found that the ALJ, in proceeding without a hearing, 
had denied Brown the benefit of the Patti presumption, by re-
lieving the Secretary of the burden of coming forward with evi-
dence that Brown's alcohol abuse had changed.22 The court 
therefore remanded the case for a hearing. 23 
13. [d. at 365. 
14. [d. 
15. 713 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam; the panel members were Goodwin and 
Hug, JJ. and Solomon, D.J., sitting by designation). 
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In Leschniok v. Heckler,24 the Secretary terminated SSDI 
benefits of three claimants who were involved in vocational reha-
bilitation programs.2& The Ninth Circuit held this to be in viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. section 425(b),28 which provides that the Secre-
tary shall not terminate or suspend disability payments on 
cessation of the recipient's impairments if the recipient is partic-
ipating in an approved vocational rehabilitation program and 
the Commissioner of Social Security determines that continua-
tion of the program will increase the likelihood that the person 
may be. permanently removed from the disability rolls. 
The Secretary here terminated benefits on the basis of med-
ical improvement without investigating whether any of the 
claimants met the statutory criteria for continued benefits under 
section 425(b).27 The claimants appealed. In hearings before 
ALJ's, two claimants were found to have improved medically, 
and the denials of benefits were upheld.28 The ALJ's were in-
structed by the Social Security Administration to ignore section 
425(b), and claimants were therefore not permitted to raise that 
section.29 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of an 
application for a preliminary injunction restraining the Secre-
tary from denying benefits without first determining whether 
section 425 requires that benefits be continued.30 The court re-
jected the arguments made by the Secretary opposing the grant-
ing of an injunction, noting that the proper forum for the Secre-
24. 713 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were 
Sneed, J. and Reed, J., sitting by designation). 
25. [d. at 521. 
26. [d. at 522. 
27. [d. at 521. 
28. The third was found not to have improved medically. His benefits were rein-
stated; the Ninth Circuit therefore dismissed his claim on the basis of lack of present 
claim or controversy. 
29. 713 F.2d at 521. 
30. [d. at 524. The court predicated jurisdiction, as had the District Court, on 28 
U.S.C. § 1361, which permits II. federal court to compel officers of the United States to 
perform their duties. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Supreme Court 
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to require exhaustion of administrative remedies for So-
cial Security claims, and the Ninth Circuit held in RoAne v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 832 (9th 
Cir. 1976) that § 1361 does not provide a separate avenue from § 405 for seeking refunds. 
The Leschnoik court disginguished RoAne on the grounds that that case had involved 
payment of funds, holding that § 1361 is an independent ground of jurisdiction in review 
of constitutional challenges which do not directly seek payment of benefits. 
26
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tary's expression of dissatisfaction with an existing law was 
Congress, not the Ninth Circuit.31 
In Lopez v. Heckler,32 the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a 
partial stay· pending appeal of a preliminary injunction re-
straining the Secretary from failing to follow, implement, or ac-
cord precedential value to the Patti decision.33 The Secretary 
had announced that she "did not acquiesce in" and would not 
follow the Patti and Finnegan decisions.3• In Lopez, the Secre-
tary did not contest that part of the injunction requiring her to 
follow Patti, but sought a stay of that portion of the order re-
quiring reinstatement of benefits to any member of the class of 
plaintiffs who was terminated subsequent to August 25, 1980 
that applied for reinstatement on the grounds that he had had 
no medical improvement.3/1 
The Ninth Circuit applied the interrelated tests for review-
ing stays pending appeal enunciated in Los Angeles Memorial 
Commission v. National Football League,38 requiring the mov-
ing party to show the possibility of irreparable injury, balancing 
the hardships, as well as the probability of success on the merits, 
which the court equated with the existence of serious legal 
questions.37 
In balancing the hardships, the court found that the inter-
ests of the Secretary, as a representative of the public, were not· 
exclusively to be found in conserving the government's finances, 
noting that "the government must be concerned not just with 
the public fisc, but with the public weal."38 The court found that 
the plaintiffs, on the other hand, could never be made whole for 
benefits denied now by their reinstatement in the future. 39 
. 31. [d. 
32. 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Reinhard, J.; the other panel members were 
Pregerson and Boochever, JJ.). 
33. [d. at 1434. 
34. [d. In Finnegan v. Mathews, 641 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1981), the court held that 
benefits to claimaints "grandfathered" into the Social Security program from state pro-
grams may not be terminated absent a showing of previous clear and specific error, or 
medical improvement. 
35. 713 F.2d at 1434. 
36. 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). 
37. 713 F.2d at 1435. 
38. [d. at 1437. 
39. [d. 
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Regarding the probability of success on the merits, the 
Court rejected the Secretary's jurisdictional arguments. The 
court deemed the Secretary to have taken a "final position" re-
garding the termination of benefits, and thus to have waived the 
requirement under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies.40 The court declined to find those class 
members barred who had failed to apply for reinstatement 
within 60 days (required under section 405(g» as the Secretary 
had not raised the issue below.41 
The Patti decision and its progeny represent the latest 
chapter in the history of the judicial supremacy doctrine. As in 
Marbury v. Madison,42 these cases take place against the back-
drop of quite different political struggles in the executive and 
legislative branches. While the Ninth Circuit has consistently 
held in favor of claimants, preferring the risk of unnecessary ex-
penditure to that of human suffering, the court has equally 
shown itself capable of guarding its own prerogatives, and re-
sisting incursions from coordinate branches of government. 
40. [d. at 1439. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) consists of three requirements. First, a claimant 
must have presented a claim for benefits to the Secretary. Second, a final decision must 
have been made by the Secretary. Finally, appeals must be made within 60 days of the 
Secretary's final decision. The court deemed the first requirement to have been complied 
with once the Secretary had a chance to act and benefits had actually been terminated. 
The second requirement was deemed by the court to have been waived by the Secretary, 
or excused, or complied with. The court declined to consider the third requirement, say-
ing that since the 60 day requirement may be waived by the parties, and since the Secre-
tary had not raised the issue below, the court need not consider the matter. 
41. On September 9, 1983, 16 days after the Ninth Circuit's Lopez opinion was is-
sued, Justice Rehnquist granted a stay of the District Court's order. 104 S.Ct. 9 (1983). 
In so doing, the Justice made it clear that he was not staying or reversing the decision, 
and that the Ninth Circuit's opinion remains the law of this circuit. [d. at 12. 
Justice Rehnquist focused on the exhaustion requirement of § 405(g), which he 
noted had been held to be composed of a waivable and a nonwaivable component. The 
nonwaivable component - that a claim for benefits have been presented to the Secre-
tary before judicial review can be sought - was held by the Ninth Circuit to be satisfied 
once the Secretary had had an opportunity to act, and benefits had been terminated. 
Justice Rehnquist did not address this argument, but merely stated that he "had diffi-
culty in seeing" how the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirement. [d. at 14. 
Having also determined that some members of the class had not satisfied the waiv-
able component of § 405(g), Justice Rehnquist turned to the issue of whether the District 
Court had the authority to issue an injunction to a coordinate branch of government. 
Justice Rehnquist nowhere expressly stated what he considered to be the rule in this 
area, but implied that the District Court had exceeded its constitutional authority under 
Article III of the Constitution. [d. at 15-16. 
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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